BY: Mustapha Lawal
The 2025 Anambra governorship election, held on November 8, was more than a contest between political parties. It unfolded amid a digital battlefield where rumours, manipulated visuals, identity-based narratives, and coordinated misinformation competed with official information for influence. By the time voters approached polling units, the battle for perception was well underway.
Citizens navigated not only ballots but also an intricate ecosystem of information, much of it misleading or strategically designed to erode trust. Civil society groups, fact-checking coalitions, and election observers warned that the election was as much about narratives as votes. This report details the specific narratives that competed with votes, underscoring a vital truth: safeguarding democracy in the digital age now requires winning the information war as much as securing the ballot box.
A Pre-Election Information Environment Under Pressure
Months before election day, the digital environment in Anambra was under stress. The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD-West Africa) deployed 178 observers across 21 LGAs and 57 grassroots monitors called “Soldiers of Mouth”, tasked with tracking false narratives. Their October report highlighted seven recurring patterns of harmful narratives, including attacks on security agencies, religiously coded messaging, manipulated endorsements, fear of “unknown gunmen”, misrepresented Igbo-language statements, delegitimisation of INEC, and gender-targeted disinformation against female actors.
These narratives posed three interconnected risks: suppressing voter turnout, deepening communal tensions, and heightening post-election conflict. CJID’s social media landscape analysis confirmed these findings. The report highlighted institutional delegitimisation, identity polarisation, security panic narratives, and coordinated amplification as the dominant online risks. Many posts were not organic but strategically designed to influence public perception.
Civil society groups, including SIDEC, warned political actors against spreading hate speech and misinformation. The EU-SDGN II programme also trained INEC’s Voter Education and Publicity staff in digital literacy and fact-checking, preparing them to respond proactively.
Disinformation Tactics That Defined the Election
The manipulation of security narratives proved particularly potent. Rumours about unknown gunmen and threats of violence circulated across WhatsApp and social media, warning that certain areas of the state were unsafe for voters. Even though these threats were unverified, they amplified fear and likely influenced turnout in sensitive communities.
At the same time, INEC faced persistent delegitimisation efforts. Fake press releases, doctored screenshots, and social media posts portraying the commission as biased or incompetent were shared widely, creating a climate in which official announcements were met with suspicion. Religion and identity were subtly weaponised, with content framing candidates according to Anglican or Catholic affiliations emerging as a recurring theme, designed to deepen communal divides and influence voter sentiment.
Manipulated endorsements, particularly involving former presidential candidate Peter Obi, created the perception of inevitability or rejection of rivals, while misrepresentation of statements in Igbo added another layer of confusion. Female political actors faced smear campaigns that aimed to reduce visibility and influence, reflecting broader systemic challenges in ensuring inclusive democratic engagement.
Election Day: The Infodemic in Real Time
On November 8, misinformation escalated, moving from rumours to viral content in real time. The Nigerian Fact-Checkers’ Coalition documented 28 major claims circulating around the polls, with six verified as true, fourteen false, seven misleading, and one unproven. Some false claims involved old images repurposed to depict election violence, misleading videos suggesting intimidation at polling units, or premature announcements of winners.
Instances of vote-buying were reported, with cash inducements ranging from ₦2,000 to ₦10,000 per voter, and other instances involving food items like Gala and Malt. Even when debunked, misleading claims about voter turnout and historical participation continued to shape public perception, demonstrating the resilience of misinformation in influencing civic engagement.
Moreover, despite an impressive PVC registration rate of 98.8%, voter turnout remained low, highlighting persistent voter apathy and widespread scepticism toward the electoral process. Observers deployed across all 21 LGAs documented significant logistical gaps, including uneven allocation of BVAS devices and irregular distribution of the state’s 60,000-strong security personnel.
These operational shortcomings not only undermined public confidence but also exposed systemic vulnerabilities that Nigeria must address incrementally to strengthen democratic resilience. This intersection of misinformation, operational weaknesses, and voter perception underscored the fragility of institutional trust and the enduring challenge of ensuring meaningful participation.
Post-Election Narratives and Impacts
Even after results were officially released, narratives shifted rather than disappeared. False claims regarding altered results, compromised collation centres, or the disenfranchisement of certain LGAs emerged immediately after INEC released official outcomes.
Observers noted that the cumulative effect of weeks of misinformation had primed the electorate to view even verified announcements with scepticism. Religious and identity-based framing persisted online, subtly influencing public discourse and civic confidence. In many ways, voters were conditioned to doubt the electoral process itself, not because of evidence of misconduct but due to the saturation of misleading narratives over several months.
Reflections on Electoral Integrity and Information Ecosystems
The 2025 Anambra election underscores that modern electoral integrity extends beyond logistical arrangements to encompass the quality of information available to citizens. Voters are influenced not just by candidates’ campaigns but by the narratives surrounding the process. Institutional trust, once eroded, magnifies the impact of false narratives, while identity-based and gendered misinformation can further undermine cohesion and participation. Fact-checking, while crucial, must be combined with proactive communication, digital literacy, and sustained civic engagement to build resilient democratic ecosystems.
The election also illustrated that democracy in the digital age requires attention to the information ecosystem as much as to ballots and polling units. Coordinated disinformation, identity-based framing, and institutional mistrust shaped voter behaviour and perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, the resilience demonstrated by civil society, fact-checkers, and proactive institutional responses shows that safeguarding elections is possible. Building strong, trustworthy, and informed channels of communication remains essential to ensuring that the electorate can navigate the flood of information, separate fact from fiction, and make informed decisions. Protecting electoral integrity now requires winning the information war, not just ensuring ballot security.
